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I. SUCCESSOR LIABILITY-Medical Designs, Inc. v. Shannon,
Gracey, Ratliff & Miller, L.L.P.1NO Texas case law discusses whether a successor partnership is lia-
ble for the tortious acts of a prior partnership, perhaps because
the Texas Uniform Partnership Act (TUPA) 2 provides that "dis-
solution of the partnership does not of itself discharge the existing liabil-
ity of any partner,"'3 except under specified, limited circumstances.4
* B.A., Southern Methodist University; J.D., University of Texas, Attorney at Law,
Haynes and Boone, L.L.P., San Antonio, Texas.
** B.A., University of Texas; J.D., University of Houston Law Center, Attorney at
Law, Haynes and Boone, L.L.P., Austin, Texas.
1. 922 S.W.2d 626 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1996, writ denied).
2. TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 6132b (Vernon Supp. 1995). TUPA continues to
apply until after December 31, 1998 to all partnerships formed before January 1, 1994 that
do not elect to be governed by the Texas Revised Partnership Act (TRPA). TEX. REV.
CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 6132b-10.03(a) (Vernon Supp. 1995). TRPA applies to all partner-
ships formed after December 31, 1993, except those merely continuing the business of a
dissolved partnership under TUPA, and to all partnerships after December 31, 1998. Id
§ 10.03(a), (c).
3. Id art. 6132b, § 36(1).
4. See id. § 36(2), (3) (partner discharged from liability on dissolution pursuant to an
expressed or implied agreement among the partnership, the creditor and the partner being




Similarly, under the TRPA,5 "[w]ithdrawal of a partner does not of itself
discharge the partner's liability for an obligation of the partnership in-
curred before withdrawal."'6 In this case, however, instead of pursuing
former partners, the plaintiff sought to enforce liability against an alleged
successor partnership.7 The facts contained in the opinion are skimpy on
the history of the defendant law partnership from 1985 forward. Fortu-
nately, although it was argued by the plaintiff to be important to its claim,
that history was not crucial to understanding the court's decision, which
the court reached without determining whether the defendant partner-
ship was, in fact, a successor partnership. 8
In 1985, Medical Designs, Inc. (MDI) engaged a Ft. Worth law firm,
operating as a Texas general partnership, 9 to prosecute a lawsuit against
MDI's competitor. 10 The trial court awarded MDI a judgment for over
$4 million; that judgment was reversed by the same Fort Worth Court of
Appeals that decided this legal malpractice case." In 1991, MDI sued the
firm, which by then had become a limited liability partnership (that itera-
tion of the firm will be called LLP), alleging legal malpractice and DTPA
violations.' 2 LLP moved for summary judgment on several grounds, in-
cluding that even if Texas law recognized a theory of successor liability
for the tortious acts of a previous partnership, LLP could not be held
liable to MDI because: (i) Reynolds, Shannon, Miller, Blinn, White &
Cook was not a successor partnership to Shannon, Gracey, Ratliff &
Miller; (ii) LLP was not a successor partnership to Reynolds, Shannon,
Miller, Blinn, White & Cook; and (iii) LLP was not a successor partner-
ship to the pre-Reynolds Shannon law firm of Shannon, Gracey, Ratliff &
Miller.13 Without explanation, the trial court granted summary judgment
in favor of LLP on the basis that the defendant law firm was not a succes-
sor to the firm that handled the 1985 litigation.' 4
MDI's principal argument on appeal was that the contractual nature of
the attorney-client relationship resulted in the assumption by LLP, as a
successor partnership, of both the benefit of its predecessor's contracts
5. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 6132b-7.03.
6. Id. § 7.03(a).
7. Medical Designs, 922 S.W.2d at 628.
8. See id.
9. Although it is difficult to get all of this from the opinion, apparently Shannon,
Gracey, Ratliff & Miller existed as a general partnership before 1985. Then, between 1985
and 1988, that firm merged with a Houston-based firm to create the general partnership
Reynolds, Shannon, Miller, Blinn, White & Cook. Sometime in 1988, the merger was
aborted and Shannon, Gracey, Ratliff & Miller was formed anew. In 1991, the partnership
took the necessary actions to become a registered limited liability partnership.
10. Id. at 627.
11. Id.
12. Id. at 628. When MDI filed suit, Shannon, Gracey, Ratliff & Miller was a general
partnership governed by TUPA, which imposes liability on the partnership for the mal-
practice of its lawyers. Id. (citing TUPA § 13); see also TRPA § 3.03 (a partnership gov-
erned by TRPA is liable for loss or injury resulting from the wrongful act or omission of a
partner acting in the ordinary course or with the partnership's authority).




and the associated burden of liability for the predecessor firm's malprac-
tice.15 The court affirmed the trial court's judgment holding that LLP
could not be held liable for the acts of Shannon, Gracey, Ratliff & Miller,
because, even if LLP was a successor partnership, "Texas law does not
recognize that successor partnerships are liable for the tortious conduct
of predecessor partnerships.' 1 6 Without citing any of them, the court also
said that it was not persuaded by MDI's reliance on cases involving a
successor entity's liability for contractual obligations, as opposed to tort
liability. 17
Moreover, the court held that MDI waived any argument that LLP was
directly liable to MDI by failing to challenge LLP's assertion in its sum-
mary judgment motion that it never violated the DTPA or any duty to
MDI.18 Finally, the court noted that MDI was not without remedy-the
dissolution of a partnership alone does not discharge the existing liability
of an individual partner. 19
II. FIDUCIARY DUTY
A. EXEMPLARY DAMAGES-Hawthorne v. Guenther20
This case involved whether a managing partner breached her fiduciary
duties and engaged in self-dealing, justifying an award of exemplary dam-
ages. Guenther and Lyn Hawthorne invested in a number of business
ventures, both together and separately, using shared investment informa-
tion.21 One venture was a partnership called "Cellular Mole" consisting
15. Id.
16. Id. at 629. The court frequently noted that Texas law does not recognize successor
liability, but for support it relied only on cases from Illinois, Kansas and Wisconsin. Id. at
628. Neither TRPA nor TUPA provides direct guidance on the continuing liability of a
"successor partnership"; however, TRPA defines when a partnership is considered to be
"continuing the business" of another partnership and TUPA defines when creditors of a
prior or dissolved partnership are creditors of a partnership that continues the business of
the prior or dissolved partnership. TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 6132b, § 41 (Vernon
Supp. 1995). MDI had asserted on appeal that there was at least one fact issue (sufficient
to preclude a summary judgment) about whether LLP is a successor law firm to Shannon,
Gracey, Ratliff & Miller, but that issue was never reached because the court found no basis
for liability. Medical Designs, 922 S.W.2d at 628. The court used the same basis to disallow
MDI's attempt to supplement the record and obtain a new trial based on newly discovered
advertising materials for LLP. Id. at 629. The materials allegedly contained language that
could be construed as holding LLP out as a successor firm of the prior partnership. Id.
17. Medical Designs, 922 S.W.2d at 628 ("[Wlhether the new firm must fulfill an obli-
gation created by contract with MDI by the prior firm is certainly a different question than
whether the new firm must pay for tortious acts for which the old firm would allegedly
have been responsible.").
18. Id. at 629. MDI argued that because LLP used the same name and both partner-
ships rendered services to MDI, the partnerships were, in fact, the same and the prior
partnership was not dissolved as to MDL Id. at 628-29. Presumably, MDI was asserting
that LLP was liable based on a theory that it was continuing the business of one or more
partnerships.
19. Id. at 629. MDI did not specifically allege that any of LLP's lawyers committed
malpractice. Id. There was no discussion of possible limitations issues affecting claims
against individual partners.
20. 917 S.W.2d 924 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1996, writ denied).
21. Id. at 927.
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of Hawthorne, as managing partner, Hawthorne's husband, Monty,
Guenther and three others, to participate in a lottery for the rights to
cellular telephone licenses. 22 The partners agreed to equally apportion
the costs of filing for the licenses and any future remuneration derived
from them.23
In 1988 and 1990, Lyn Hawthorne sent Guenther letters advising that
the partnership had sold two cellular franchises and enclosing checks for
$10,153.71 and $150,000, representing Guenther's purported share of the
partnership's profits from the sales. 24 Guenther testified that: (i) he was
never consulted about any sale of the franchises; (ii) his 1989 U.S. income
tax Schedule K-1 indicated that his partnership earnings were more than
$400,000, even though he received only the two checks; and (iii) proceeds
from the 1989 franchise sale were paid to Cellular Mole, which disbursed
funds only to Lyn and Monty Hawthorne. 25 None of Lyn Hawthorne's
correspondence to Guenther mentioned either an agreement to offset her
investment losses from other ventures involving Guenther's participation
or advice against Guenther's share of partnership earnings or disclosed
the receipt or disbursement of partnership revenues, except the amounts
actually paid to Guenther. 26 In addition, Cellular Mole's accountant tes-
tified that the Partnership's 1986 tax return revealed that Lyn Hawthorne,
personally, and two businesses owned by her and her husband owed Cel-
lular Mole a total of $378,500 in "advances," none of which was evi-
denced by a promissory note.27 Guenther demanded an accounting from
Lyn Hawthorne, who, apparently for the first time, responded that
Guenther was obligated to reimburse her for losses that she incurred in
their other joint investments.28 Guenther refused, filed suit and won a
jury award against Lyn Hawthorne for $640,000 in actual damages and
$850,000 in exemplary damages for breach of fiduciary duty.2 9
Hawthorne appealed, arguing that the evidence was insufficient to sup-
port (i) a finding of a breach of fiduciary duty and (ii) an award of exem-
plary damages.30 In deciding the evidence questions, the court first
considered the nature and existence of a fiduciary duty. Noting that the
partnership issues in this case were governed by the TUPA,31 the court
stated that well-settled Texas law recognizes that partners owe one an-
other a fiduciary duty and that "[a] managing partner owes his co-part-
22. Id.
23. Id. at 927-28.




28. Id. By 1992, the partnership owed Guenther $440,272.25; Hawthorne, however,
withheld Guenther's distribution because "he owed her money." Id.
29. Id. at 927.
30. Id. at 929.
31. The partnership was formed before January 1, 1994. Id. at 934 n.2. Despite the
absence of a written partnership agreement, there was considerable undisputed evidence
that Cellular Mole was a partnership. Id. at 934.
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ners the highest fiduciary duty recognized by law."' 32 The court observed
that TUPA and common law fiduciary duties require partners to (i) fully
disclose matters affecting the partnership, (ii) account for profits and
property and refrain from self-dealing, and (iii) refrain from competition
with the partnership. 33 In the case of a managing partner, the court
found a fiduciary duty (a shade of the duty of loyalty) to avoid being
positioned to benefit from violating the duty "to administer the partner-
ship affairs solely for the benefit of the partnership. '34
The court identified considerable evidence to support the jury's finding
that Lyn Hawthorne breached her fiduciary duty to Guenther: (i) "[she]
admitted receiving and spending Guenther's share of the partnership pro-
ceeds;" (ii) she lent herself substantial partnership funds, without inform-
ing the other partners, without paying interest on the amounts borrowed,
and without even signing promissory notes to evidence the loans; (iii) she
instructed the partnership's accountant to withhold partnership informa-
tion from Guenther; (iv) she purchased for her own benefit the interest of
two other partners without giving the remaining partners or the partner-
ship the opportunity to purchase the interests; (v) she sold substantially
all of the assets of the partnership without informing Guenther; and
(vi) "[she] made immediate distributions to herself and to her husband
while withholding funds from the other partners. '35
Lyn Hawthorne appealed the exemplary damage award, arguing that
there was no jury finding to support the award because the jury charge
failed to ask if the breach of fiduciary duty "was done so intentionally,
fraudulently, maliciously, or involved self-dealing." 36 The court agreed
that an award of exemplary damages for a fiduciary breach required "a
finding of an aggravating factor, whether it be intent, self-dealing, or mal-
32. Id. The court likely would have reached the same result under the TRPA, given
the nature of'the breaches, even though TRPA seeks to eliminate the strict fiduciary duties
developed under Texas common law (TPRA § 4.04 states that partners are not trustees and
do not owe the duties that trustees owe). The Texas Supreme Court undermined that
legislative effort in M.R. Champion, Inc. v. Mizell, 904 S.W.2d 617, 618 (Tex. 1995), holding
that principles applicable to a case under TRPA were the same as under TUPA with re-
spect to fiduciary duties. For a discussion of Mizell and its misplaced reinstatement of
traditional fiduciary duties into partnership law, see TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 6132b
cnt. (Vernon Supp. 1996) and Steven A. Waters, Partnerships, Annual Survey of Texas
Law, 49 SMU L. REV. 1205, 1208 (1996).
33. Hawthorne, 917 S.W.2d at 934. TUPA § 21 says
(1) Every partner must account to the partnership for any benefit, and hold
as trustee for it any profits derived by him without the consent of the other
partners from any transaction connected with the formation, conduct, or liq-
uidation of the partnership or from any use by him of its property.
34. Hawthorne, 917 S.W.2d at 934.
35. Id. at 934-35. The court rejected Hawthorne's defense that she withheld
Guenther's share based on the alleged arrangement with Guenther that allowed her to
offset her losses from his investment recommendations with partnership asset sales. Id. at
935. The only supporting evidence was her testimony and her husband's, who claimed that
he eavesdropped on a telephone conversation between Lyn Hawthorne and Guenther




ice."'37 The trial court failed to include in the jury charge a question on
the aggravating factor,38 but Hawthorne did not preserve any complaints
about the charge,39 leaving for the court only the question of whether
there was factually sufficient evidence in the record of Hawthorne's in-
tent.40 The court cited Lyn Hawthorne's actions, noted above, as "some
evidence" that she intended to gain an additional benefit for herself
through the partnership, which the court found sufficient to support the
exemplary damages award.41
B. ExPuSIoN-Bohatch v. Butler & Binion42
At issue in this case was whether a law firm and some of its partners
breached the law firm's partnership agreement and their fiduciary duties
by expelling a partner and eliminating her monthly draw and year-end
distribution. Perhaps the most interesting thing about the case is that the
Texas Supreme Court has accepted it for review, as noted in more detail
at the end of this discussion.
Bohatch involves a claim by a former law firm partner that she was
expelled from the firm because she discovered and reported that the
managing partner in her office was overbilling an important client of the
firm.43 Bohatch maintained that the partnership and several named part-
ners breached their fiduciary duty to her when they expelled her, and that
they also breached the firm's partnership agreement in a number of
respects.
The trial court granted the partnership's motions for summary judg-
ment on Bohatch's claims of wrongful discharge, breach of fiduciary duty
for acts occurring on or after the date she was expelled and breach of the
duty of good faith and fair dealing for acts occurring on or after that
date."4 The trial court submitted to the jury the breach of contract claims
and breach of fiduciary duty claims for acts occurring before expulsion.45
The jury awarded plaintiff actual damages of $57,000 for lost earnings,
$250,000 for mental anguish, and $4 million in punitive damages based on
a finding of breach of fiduciary duty "'with an intent to gain additional
benefit.' 46
Later, the trial court suggested a remittitur of the punitive damages
award, which plaintiff accepted, and entered a second judgment leaving
the actual damages award intact, but reducing the punitive damages to
37. Id. at 936.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 935.
40. Id. at 936.
41. Id. at 937.
42. 905 S.W.2d 597 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1995, writ granted).
43. Id. at 599-600.
44. Id. at 600.
45. Id.
46. Id. The punitive damages were assessed evenly among three individual partners.
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$237,141. 47 The partnership challenged all of the jury's findings on
appeal.
A number of issues were considered on appeal, including the fiduciary
duty owed to a partner being expelled from a partnership. In the absence
of controlling Texas cases, the court relied on cases from other jurisdic-
tions to hold that, when expelling another partner, partners have a fiduci-
ary duty not to act in bad faith. In this context, that meant avoiding
effecting the expulsion for self gain.48
The court found no evidence of bad faith in this case.49 For one thing,
plaintiff's partnership interest was so small that the court found that the
jury could not have "reasonably concluded" that she was expelled so the
other partners could assume that interest.50 The other "self gain" allega-
tion-that she was expelled because she raised the issue of overbilling the
firm's important client and that her expulsion was to protect the manag-
ing partner's inflated distribution and the firm's relationship with that cli-
ent-was severely undermined by the client's statements that they found
the firm's billings to be acceptable.51
The plaintiff had more success on her claim that the partnership
breached the partnership agreement in its treatment of her, although she
was unsuccessful in claiming that she had been constructively expelled
when her year-end distribution was eliminated and her future distribution
percentage was reduced to zero.52 The court found that the partnership
could establish draws and distributions pursuant to the partnership agree-
ment, and that the provisions relating to that issue were independent of
the expulsion provisions.53 The court did, however, find that the firm had
breached the partnership agreement by failing to follow the stated re-
quirements to give notice and an explanation relating to change in the
plaintiff's distribution percentage.5 4 For that breach, the court upheld the
award of actual damages of $35,000.00 in past lost earnings, and
$225,000.00 in attorney's fees, plus interest.
Bohatch appealed to the Texas Supreme Court, which granted writ on
six points of error and, because it granted writ on Bohatch's application,
on the Partnership's cross-application. 55 The following are the points of
error on non-procedural issues that will be considered by the Texas
Supreme Court:
47. Id. at 601.
48. Id. at 602.
49. Id. at 603.
50. IM. at 604.
51. Id. at 600. Plaintiff's doubts regarding the client's request that her work be super-
vised were likewise severely weakened by confirmation of the client's concerns. Id.
52. Id. at 605.
53. Id. at 605-06.
54. Id. The agreement provided: "Upon written notice from the management com-
mittee stating the reasons therefore, a partner's tentative distribution percentage can be
reduced for good cause at any time." Id.
55. Bohatch v. Butler & Binion, 40 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 28 (Oct. 18, 1996).
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Point of Error No. 1
The Court of Appeals erred in finding that there was no evidence
that the Respondents' expulsion of Bohatch was in part motivated by
"self gain."
Point of Error No. 3
The Court of Appeals erred by reviewing the legal sufficiency of
the evidence to support the jury's finding of a breach of fiduciary
duty under a definition of fiduciary duty different from that submit-
ted to the jury.
Point of Error No. 4
The Court of Appeals erred in defining "breach of fiduciary duty"
more narrowly than the Texas Supreme Court. The Court of Ap-
peals erred in holding that the only fiduciary duty that partners owe
one another when expelling another partner is not to do so for self
gain.
Point of Error No. 5
The Court of Appeals erred in failing to hold that the fiduciary
duty that the partners owe when expelling another partner requires
that they act fairly, honestly, in the utmost good faith, with undivided
loyalty, and disclose all material information.
Point of Error No. 6
The Court of Appeals erred by failing to recognize that the fiduci-
ary duty law partners owe one another prohibits expulsion of a part-
ner in retaliation for fulfilling his ethical responsibility to report the
wrongdoing of another partner.5 6
Perhaps the results of the Texas Supreme Court's review will be reported
here next year.
III. POWER AND AUTHORITY TO WAIVE ATTORNEY-
CLIENT PRIVILEGE IN BANKRUPTCY-
United States v. Campbell57
As a general rule, each partner in a general partnership is an agent of
the partnership and has the power and authority to bind the partner-
ship. 58 It follows that, typically, a partner is the appropriate authority to
waive the attorney-client privilege on behalf of a partnership. The ques-
tion in this case was whether a bankruptcy trustee can waive the privilege
on behalf of a partnership in bankruptcy. 59
Campbell was the general partner of a limited partnership called 3700
WFA Limited (the Partnership), and Campbell's personal attorney,
56. Id. at 28-29.
57. 73 F.3d 44 (5th Cir. 1996).
58. TRPA § 3.02; TUPA § 9. Exceptions apply if the partner does not have the au-
thority to act for the partnership in a particular matter and the person with whom the
partner is dealing has knowledge of that fact.
59. Campbell, 73 F.3d at 44.
1400 [Vol. 50
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O'Connor, was the sole limited partner.60 On June 30, 1986, the Partner-
ship filed a Chapter 11 bankruptcy petition signed by Rogers, the Part-
nership's attorney.61  Campbell, as general partner, signed the
verification.62 Subsequently, Campbell engaged in a number of question-
able transactions involving the Partnership's bank account and the ac-
count of a separate business entity.63
On October 27, 1987, the bankruptcy court entered an order converting
the Partnership's proceeding to a Chapter 7 case and appointed Cage as
the bankruptcy trustee. 64 After Cage investigated the transfers from the
bankrupt estate, Campbell was indicted and convicted of bankruptcy
fraud, in part based on the testimony of Rogers.65 At the trial, Campbell
argued that Rogers should not have been allowed to testify over Camp-
bell's objection that the testimony was privileged as an attorney-client
communication.66 The district court allowed Rogers to testify because (i)
a personal attorney-client relationship between Rogers and Campbell
had not been established and (ii) Rogers' contact with Campbell was
based solely on her capacity as the Partnership's attorney.67 Pursuant to
a hearsay rule exception, the court also admitted testimony of Rogers and
a letter from Cage to Rogers as evidence of waiver of the privilege. 6
Campbell appealed his bankruptcy fraud conviction on the basis that
there were hearsay rule violations and that harmful evidence was admit-
ted when the district court erroneously concluded that Cage could waive
the attorney-client privilege on behalf of the Partnership.69 Campbell ar-
gued that limited partnerships were more like a natural person than a
corporation 70 and that, therefore, the holding of the United States
Supreme Court in Commodity Futures Trading Commission v. Wein-
traub,71 that a bankruptcy trustee may waive the privilege on behalf of a
60. Id. at 45-46.
61. Id. at 46. The court notes that Rogers did not establish a personal attorney-client
relationship with Campbell at any time. Id. at 47.
62. Id. at 46.
63. Id. Campbell deposited into the Partnership's account a check from the account of
the separate business entity containing insufficient funds to cover the check. Id. Before
the check was returned for insufficient funds, however, Campbell arranged a wire transfer
to a bank from the Partnership's account to make a payment on the mortgage against
Campbell's personal residence. Id. Interestingly, O'Connor, who was a limited partner,
later sent a letter questioning Campbell about the transactions, explaining that, as an attor-
ney, he had to avoid any appearance of impropriety with respect to transferring funds out
of the Partnership's bankruptcy estate. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id. Campbell never responded to Cage's letter requesting an explanation for the
transfer to the Partnership's account. Id.
66. Id. Aside from her testimony related to the alleged waiver of attorney-client privi-




69. Id. at 45.
70. Id. at 47.
71. 471 U.S. 343 (1985).
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corporation, was inapplicable to a limited partnership.72
The Supreme Court, in dicta, had distinguished the waiver of the privi-
lege by an individual in bankruptcy from that of a corporation because an
individual can act for himself but a corporation, controlled by manage-
ment, can only act through its agents. 73 The Fifth Circuit explained that
the Supreme Court's holding with respect to corporations was based on
the similarity of the duties of the bankruptcy trustee to those of the of-
ficers and directors of a solvent corporation, who have the power to
waive the privilege on behalf of the corporation.74
Based on Commodity Futures Trading Commission, the Fifth Circuit
affirmed the district court's judgment, holding that "[a] limited partner-
ship, like a corporation, is an inanimate entity that can act only through
its agents. Accordingly, the same rule that applies to corporations in
bankruptcy should apply to a bankrupt limited partnership. '75 The court
concluded that the district court did not err in holding that Cage, as bank-
ruptcy trustee, had the authority to waive the attorney-client privilege on
behalf of the Partnership. 76
IV. BANKRUPTCY-CREDITOR CLAIMS AGAINST BOTH
PARTNERSHIP AND PARTNER IN BANKRUPTCY-
In re El Paso Refining, Inc. 77
In this case, El Paso Refining, Inc. (EP Inc.) executed an unconditional
guaranty in favor of the predecessor-in-interest to Scurlock Permian Cor-
poration (Scurlock), 78 guaranteeing payment of loans made by Scurlock
to El Paso Refinery L.P. (EP L.P.), a limited partnership in which EP Inc.
was the sole general partner.79 Subsequently, EP L.P. and EP Inc. filed
for bankruptcy-in October, 1992 and October, 1993, respectively.80
In addition to determining whether EP Inc., as a bankruptcy debtor,
was liable for interest accruals on the guaranteed obligation and whether
the guaranteed obligations had been satisfied,81 the court considered the
liability of partners and a partnership for the debts of the other when
both are in bankruptcy.8 2 Specifically, the court considered whether
72. Campbell, 73 F.3d at 47 (citing Weintraub, 471 U.S. at 358).
73. Id. (citing Weintraub, 471 U.S. at 356).
74. Id. (citing Weintraub, 471 U.S. at 348, 351, 358). The court also cited opinions by
the Fifth and Eighth Circuits to support the rationale that corporations and partnerships
should be treated the same with regard to attorney-client privilege matters.
75. Id. Certainly, the strong modem trend, evidenced in the TRLPA and TRPA, is to
treat partnerships more as distinct entities, and much less as an aggregate of individuals (as
was the case for the TUPA).
76. Id. The applicable standard of review was whether the district court's finding of a
waiver was clearly erroneous. Id. at 46.
77. 192 B.R. 144 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1996).
78. Id. at 145.
79. Id. at 145-46.





§ 723(c) of the United States Bankruptcy Code83 barred creditor
Scurlock's claim against general partner EP Inc., in the letter's capacity as
a guarantor.84
The court explained that § 723(c) was enacted to overrule the "jingle
rule" of priority,85 which provided that a partnership's assets were first
distributed to partnership creditors and a partner's assets were first dis-
tributed to the partner's creditors.86 Only after their respective credi-
tors' claims were satisfied would any distributions be made to the
creditors of the other party.87 The court noted that in recognition of the
principle that a general partner is equally liable for its own obligations
and the partnership's obligations, "Congress drafted § 723 to provide that
when a partner enters bankruptcy the unsatisfied partnership's creditors
share in the partner's estate at the same level as the partner's own credi-
tors."' 88 The court explained that pursuant to § 723(c), the partnership
trustee-and only the partnership trustee-may bring a claim against the
partner's estate for the entire amount of "unsatisfied claims" against the
partnership.89
Following its "unsatisfied claims" concept, the court held that § 723(c)
did not bar Scurlock's claim against EP Inc.90 The court found that
§ 723(c) did not apply to that claim because Scurlock had already settled
with the EP L.P. estate, leaving "no unsatisfied portion against the part-
83. 11 U.S.C. § 723(c) (1995) provides:
Notwithstanding section 728(c) of this title, the trustee has a claim against
the estate of each general partner in such partnership that is a debtor in a
case under this title for the full amount of all claims of creditors allowed in
the case concerning such partnership. Notwithstanding section 502 of this
title, there shall not be allowed in such partner's case a claim against such
partner on which both such partner and such partnership are liable, except to
any extent that such claim is secured only by property of such partner and
not by property of such partnership. The claim of the trustee under this sub-
section is entitled to distribution in such partner's case under section 726(a)
of this title the same as any other claim of a kind specified in such section.
84. El Paso, 192 B.R. at 146.
85. Id. at 147.
86. Id.
87. Id. TUPA contains a state law "jingle rule." Section 40(i) provides that the claims
of separate creditors of a bankrupt or insolvent partner have priority over partnership
creditors with respect to separate property. TUPA § 40(i). Primarily because preemptive
federal law has eliminated the jingle rule, TRPA does not contain a similar provision;
rather, a partner is required to contribute the amount necessary to satisfy partnership obli-
gations, unless the applicable creditors agreed to be satisfied only with partnership prop-
erty without recourse to individual partners. TRPA § 8.06(c).
88. El Paso, 192 B.R. at 147.
89. Id. Section 723(c) intends to prevent double recovery on claims. Id. The court
does not explain its consistent reference to "unsatisfied" claims with respect to the applica-
tion of § 723(c). The statute refers to "claims of creditors allowed in the [bankruptcy] case
concerning the partnership." 11 U.S.C. § 723(c). There is no specific statutory prerequisite
that requires a claim to be "unsatisfied" for the trustee to assert it. Logic, however, sug-
gests that the parties have no continuing interest in a claim that has been settled.
90. El Paso, 192 B.R. at 147.
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nership." 91 The court then held that "[b]ecause there is no longer a claim
which the [EP] L.P. trustee may assert on Scurlock's behalf, Scurlock's
claim [against the general partner-guarantor] for the post-settlement defi-
ciency on the guaranteed obligation [of the partnership] does not pose a
danger of double recovery [from the partnership estate]. ' 92 Therefore,
§ 723(c) did not bar Scurlock's claim on the guaranty against EP Inc.93 In
a footnote, the court explained that it did not disagree with Professor
Kennedy's view that a creditor may not prosecute a claim against a part-
ner-guarantor when there remains an unsatisfied portion of the creditor's
claim against the partnership. 94 The court then elaborated with the fol-
lowing example:
[I]f a creditor does not settle with a partnership on the creditor's
1,000 claim but instead receives a 50% payout from the partnership
estate, then even though the creditor obtained a separate guaranty
against the partner, it is likely that the partnership trustee alone has
the ability to claim a deficiency ($500) against the partner. However,
if the partner's guaranty allows the creditor to settle with the part-
nership without waiving his rights against the partner then the credi-
tor may settle with the partnership for $500, and then assert his own
claim for the $500 deficiency (based on the guaranty) directly against
91. Id. The court does not discuss the terms of or circumstances surrounding the set-
tlement between Scurlock and EP L.P. See id. (noting only that Scurlock had settled his
claim against the EP L.P.).
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 147 n.1. (citing Frank R. Kennedy, Partnerships and Partners under the Bank-
ruptcy Code: Claims and Distributions, 40 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 55, 70-71 (1983)). Profes-
sor Kennedy does not use the concept of "unsatisfied claims"; rather, he explains that "the
trustee of the partnership has a claim against the estate of the general partner for the full
amount of all claims of creditors allowed in the partnership case." Kennedy, supra, at 70.
The court apparently concluded that, because Scurlock did not make a claim against the
partnership case of EP L.P., no claim by Scurlock had been allowed. Professor Kennedy
notes that "Itihe claim of a partnership creditor against the partner's estate is ordinarily
limited to the amount of his claim against the partnership. A qualification on this limita-
tion is recognized when the creditor has a security interest in the property of the partner
but not the partnership's property." Id. at 70-71. It follows that the court relied on the fact
that the settlement effectively eliminated Scurlock's claim against the EP L.P.'s property,
leaving it, from the guaranty of EP Inc., only a claim against the property of the partner.
Arguably, Professor Kennedy would agree that § 723(c) did not apply because there was
no longer a threat of double recovery for a single claim by Scurlock. See id. at 71. Profes-
sor Kennedy has specifically noted that
The purpose of requiring the disallowance of the claim against the partner is
to protect the partner's estate against double proof of what is essentially a
single claim by the partnership creditor. The result is that the partnership
creditor who has taken the precaution to obtain the personal obligation of a
partner has no advantage over any other partnership creditor in the event of
concurrent administration of the partnership and partner's estates.
Id (citations omitted). The court did not discuss the fact that, contrary to the purpose of§ 723(c) to prevent double recovery, ultimately, Scurlock will be allowed to recover from
both the EP L.P. and EP Inc. and may receive, proportionately, more than other creditors
of EP L.P. and EP Inc. Whether this was intended under the statute is not clear from El






Moore v. Simon Enterprises96
The key issue presented in this case was whether a partnership was an
indispensable party to the litigation.97 If it was, then diversity would be
destroyed and the case would have to be remanded to state court, which
both parties acknowledged in their briefs while arguing that the partner-
ship was not an indispensable party.98 The case involved an allegation by
the trustee of two Texas trusts (whose trustee and beneficiaries were
Texas citizens) that were limited partners (Trustee), 99 that general partner
Simon Enterprises, Inc. (Simon) 100 violated their March 1, 1986 partner-
ship agreement and breached its fiduciary duty to Trustee by attempting
to transfer its interest as a general partner to an outside party without
Trustee's consent. 1 1 Initially, Trustee had also sued Simon Property
Group, L.P. (whose role is not mentioned in the opinion) and the Part-
nership, but filed a voluntary nonsuit as to them to achieve diversity juris-
diction and remove the action to federal court. 102 In his petition, Trustee
requested a declaratory judgment or, alternatively, a decree dissolving
the partnership, an accounting and damages against Simon.10 3
The court agreed with the parties that joinder of the Partnership, a
Texas limited partnership, would divest the court of its diversity jurisdic-
tion because a partnership is considered a citizen of each state in which its
general and limited partners (e.g., Simon and Trustee) hold citizenship. 0 4
Thus, the crucial issue for the court was whether the Partnership was an
indispensable party-if it was, its joinder would be required, and the fed-
eral court would have to remand the case to state court. The answer de-
pended on whether Trustee's claims were derivative or direct claims. 0 5
95. El Paso, 192 B.R. at 147 n.1. The court set another hearing to decide the value of
the suit that EP L.P. settled against Scurlock so it could determine the amount, if any, still
owed by EP Inc., as guarantor, to Scurlock. Id. at 149.
96. 919 F. Supp. 1007 (N.D. Tex. 1995).
97, See id. at 1009 (noting that the court directed both parties to file briefs on (i)
whether Hurst Mall Company, a Texas limited partnership (Partnership), should be joined
as an indispensable party pursuant to Bankston v. Burch, 27 F.3d 164, 167-68 (5th Cir.
1994), and (ii) whether joinder would destroy diversity).
98. Id.
99. Id. at 1008. The two trusts collectively owned a 20 percent limited partner's inter-
est in the Partnership. Id.
100. Id. Simon owned the remaining 80 percent interest, 50 percent as general partner
and 30 percent as a limited partner. Id.
101. Id. at 1009.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 1008.
104. 1&t at 1009 (relying on the United States Supreme Court case of Carden v. Arkoma




Relying on Bankston' 6 and Mallia v. PaineWebber,10 7 the court enunci-
ated the following general rules: (i) "[a] limited partnership is an indis-
pensable party to a derivative action brought by a limited partner to
enforce the rights of the partnership;"'10 8 (ii) if "a limited partnership
[has] not [been] joined as a party to a derivative action and its joinder
would destroy complete diversity, the action must be remanded to state
court;"'10 9 and (iii) "the citizenship of a limited partnership may be disre-
garded for diversity purposes in a direct individual action brought by a
limited partner against a general partner." 110
Simon and Trustee argued that Trustee's claims were direct. The court
stated that whether the claims were derivative or direct required a deter-
mination of the "nature of the wrongs" rather than the intent of the par-
ties."' The court explained that if the right sought to be enforced is a
right of the partnership, then the partnership is the real party in interest
and the claim is derivative."l 2 Conversely, "a plaintiff bringing an indi-
vidual, direct action must be injured directly or independently of the cor-
poration or partnership.""13 Moreover, if a limited partner claims that
wrongs to the limited partnership indirectly damaged the limited partner
by decreasing the value of his partnership interest, the partner's claim is
derivative." 4
The court relied on cases establishing that Trustee's claims of breach of
fiduciary duty and diminution in the value of the Trustee's limited part-
ner's interest were derivative claims.115 Although recognizing that case
law also establishes that the Trustee's request for an accounting was a
direct claim,116 the court noted that the derivative claims overwhelmed
Trustee's individual claim for an accounting." 7 In addition, the court ob-
served that Trustee's original petition identified claims of injury to both
Trustee and the Partnership, which would necessitate a conclusion that at
least the claims of injury to the Partnership were derivative."18
106. 27 F.3d at 167-68.
107. 889 F. Supp. 277, 281-82 (S.D. Tex. 1995). See Waters, supra note 32, at 1212-15,
for a discussion of Mallia and Bankston, and as support that Moore reconciles the two
cases correctly.
108. Moore, 919 F. Supp. at 1009 (citing Bankston, 27 F.3d at 167-68).
109. Id. (citing Bankston, 27 F.3d at 168).
110. Id. (citing Mallia, 889 F. Supp. at 281-82 and Lenz v. Associated Inns and Restau-
rants, 833 F. Supp. 362, 379 (S.D.N.Y. 1993)).
111. Id.
112. Id. at 1009-10.
113. Id. at 1010 (quoting Mallia, 889 F. Supp. at 283).
114. Id.
115. Id. (citing Mallia, 889 F. Supp. at 282, and Lenz, 833 F. Supp. at 380, as authority
that a claim of diminution in value is a derivative claim, and 7547 Corp. v. Parker & Parsley
Dev. Partners, 38 F.3d 211,221 (5th Cir. 1994), as authority that a general partner's breach
of its fiduciary duty is a derivative claim).
116. Id. at 1011 n.3 (noting that Bankston recognized that a claim for an accounting is a
direct claim).
117. Id.
118. Id. at 1010. Specifically, Trustee alleged that (i) if the attempted transfer of Si-
mon's interest were to occur, then Simon would be in breach of its fiduciary duties to both
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Weighing the four factors required under Federal Rule of Civil Proce-
dure 19(b) to determine whether the Partnership was indispensable,' 19
the court determined that: (i) given the derivative nature of Trustee's
claims, the exclusion of the Partnership would prejudice its ability to pro-
tect its interest; (ii) protective measures or other relief would not lessen
or avoid the prejudice; (iii) failure to join the Partnership could subject
Simon to duplicative litigation; and (iv) Trustee would have an adequate
remedy in state court. 120 Based on its evaluation of these Rule 19(b)
factors and the derivative nature of the Trustee's action, the court held
that the Partnership was an indispensable party. Therefore, complete di-
versity did not exist and the court was required to remand the case to
state court.121
The court was unpersuaded by an additional argument by the parties
that the court, relying on Delta Financial Corp. v. Paul D. Comanduras &
Associates122 and Curley v. Brignoli,123 should find that the Partnership
was not an indispensable party under Rule 19(b) because all of the lim-
ited partners were before the court. 24 The parties argued that, with all
interests represented in this case, the Partnership itself could not be an
indispensable party.' 25 The court declined to follow Curley because the
ruling there was made in a post-trial context.126 The court believed Delta
to be "against the weight of authority" and distinguishable because the
defendant in that case "failed to establish that the interests of the part-
nership were distinct from the interests of the partners.' 27 Instead, the
court held that the interests of the Partnership and the partners were dif-
ferent because Trustee sought dissolution and Simon was charged with
damaging the Partnership. 128 Therefore, the Partnership was an indis-
pensable party regardless of the fact that all partners were before the
court.
1 2 9
To bolster its holding, the court analogized a partnership to a corpora-
tion with "a legal existence independent of its constituent partners," stat-
the Partnership and Trustee, and (ii) injuries to both the Partnership and Trustee were the
basis of the Trustee's right of relief. Id.
119. Id. at 1011. The four factors the court must weigh are: (i) "to what extent a judg-
ment rendered in the person's absence might be prejudicial to the person or those already
parties;" (ii) "the extent to which, by protective provisions in the judgment, by the shaping
of relief, or other measures, the prejudice can be lessened or avoided;" (iii) "whether ajudgment rendered in the person's absence will be adequate;" and (iv) "whether the plain-
tiff will have an adequate remedy if the action is dismissed for nonjoinder." FED. R. Civ.
P. 19(b); see also Moore, 919 F. Supp. at 1011.
120. Moore, 919 F. Supp. at 1011.
121. Id. at 1011-12.
122. 973 F.2d 301 (4th Cir. 1992).
123. 915 F.2d 81 (2d. Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 955 (1991).
124. Moore, 919 F. Supp. at 1011.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 1012 (quoting the Curley court as saying that "it saw no reason 'at this be-
lated juncture to provide [defendants] with a windfall escape from their defeat at trial."').
127. Id. at 1011.




ing that, like a shareholder in a corporation, a limited partner enjoys
limited liability in exchange for surrendering the right to bring claims for
damages against the limited partnership itself.130 Instead, a limited part-
ner must bring such claims derivatively on behalf of the partnership.131
130. Id.
131. Id.
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